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Abstract
The article examines the convergences and contrasts between social epidemiology, social
medicine, and human rights approaches toward advancing global health and health equity. The
first section describes the goals and work of the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of
Health. The second section discusses the role of human rights in the Commission’s work. The
third section evaluates, from the perspective of social epidemiology, two rights-based approaches
to advancing health and health equity as compared to a view that focuses more broadly on social
justice. The concluding section identifies four areas where social epidemiologists, practitioners of
social medicine, and health and human rights advocates can and must work together in order to
make progress on health and health equity.
INTRODUCTION
Each of three fields — health and human rights, social medicine, and social epidemiology
— has valuable insights, and professionals working in these fields hold important roles in
advancing the health of people in society. In particular, despite the comparatively recent
establishment of the health and human rights field, it has made an enormous contribution to
the advancement of global health equity. It has done so by providing an analytical
framework to identify and protect the most vulnerable anywhere in the world from poorly
conceived public health policies as well as from the egregious abuses that make them
vulnerable to ill health and mortality. While health and human rights advocates have from
the start taken a global perspective, social medicine and social epidemiology have been
slower to catch up. Advancing global health and health equity against a wide variety of
threats — including abusive actors, unjustifiable reasoning, and plain complacency of those
who have the power to make a difference — will require coherent reasoning and
coordination across the fields of social epidemiology, social medicine, and health and
human rights. So it is welcome and commendable that this journal, the original publication
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sof the health and human rights field, is taking the lead toward building such coherence and
cooperation with a special issue on social determinants of health.
In this article, we examine the convergences and contrasts between social epidemiology,
social medicine, and human rights approaches toward advancing global health and health
equity. For the purposes of this article, we understand social medicine to be the practice of
clinical medicine in a manner that demonstrates social awareness, while social epidemiology
is the study of the social distribution of disease and causes of that distribution across groups
and individuals. The first section of the article describes the goals and work of the WHO
Commission on Social Determinants of Health. The second section discusses the role of
human rights in the Commission’s work. The third section evaluates, from the perspective of
social epidemiology, two rights-based approaches to advancing health and health equity in
comparison to a view that focuses more broadly on social justice. The article concludes by
identifying four areas where social epidemiologists, practitioners of social medicine, and
health and human rights advocates can and must work together in order to make progress on
health and health equity.
THE COMMISSION ON SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
The WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health (“the Commission”) was set up in
2005 by the late J. W. Lee, then Director-General of the World Health Organization, with
the mission to collect and synthesize global evidence on the social determinants of health,
assess their impact on health inequity, and make recommendations for action to address that
inequity.1 Members of the Commission and its secretariat were motivated by three driving
forces: a belief in social justice, respect for evidence, and frustration that there was far too
little action on the social determinants of ill health and health inequalities. These powerful
motivating forces led to three years of detailed work compiling and analyzing research,
consulting with experts from around the world as well as across many disciplines and
professions, meeting with governments and practitioners, and producing a final report and
recommendations.2 Rather than being an end in itself, the work of the Commission and the
resultant report, Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through action on the social
determinants of health (hereafter Final Report) is meant to instigate discussions within
institutions and the public sphere and help promote social action and policies to advance
health and health equity, both within countries and transnationally.
Based on the collected evidence, the Commission made its recommendations across three
overarching areas for action. The first is “to improve the conditions of daily life — the
conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age.”3 The second is to tackle the
“structural drivers of those conditions,” that is, the inequitable distribution of power, money,
and resources. The third is to “measure the problem, evaluate action, expand the knowledge
base, develop a workforce that is trained in the social determinants of health, and raise
public awareness about the social determinants of health.” Within these areas of action the
Commission made further recommendations in twelve areas: 1) early child development and
education, 2) healthy places — the living environment, 3) fair employment and decent work,
4) social protection across the life course, 5) universal health care, 6) health equity in all
policies, 7) fair financing, 8) market responsibility, 9) gender equity, 10) political
empowerment, 11) good global governance, and 12) knowledge, monitoring, and skills. The
Commission’s recommendations are necessarily broad given its global remit and the very
different contexts in which people live their lives around the world. At the same time, the
broad principles embodied in the recommendations are relevant to and applicable in all
contexts. Developing national or regional strategies to improve health equity requires
contextual analysis across the areas identified by the Commission. Indeed, the resolution
agreed at the World Health Assembly in May 2009 urges all member states to tackle health
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sinequities through action on the social determinants of health and to assess the impact of
policies and programs on health inequities.4 A number of countries and regions around the
world are in the process of taking up the Commission’s recommendations and translating
them to suit their national and regional circumstances, including England, a number of
European countries, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Canadian
provinces of Manitoba and Quebec.
The Commission’s recommendations are rooted in an analytical causal framework that is
based on the intersection of three sets of social dynamics as they relate to conditions of daily
life. The first is that the conditions of daily life in which individuals are born, grow, live,
work, and age determine their incidence of disease, their experience of morbidity, and length
of lifespan. Second, these daily living conditions include proximal determinants such as
exposure to harmful substances and biological organisms, the availability of material needs
such as food, potable water, and shelter, and the social environments that affect
psychobiological pathways and health-related behaviors. Third, these daily conditions also
have distal structural drivers or “causes of causes” — the economic, social, and political
conditions that together with background social and cultural norms create and distribute the
proximate causes across individuals and social groups.
In other words, poor health and health inequalities across individuals and social groups are
brought about by multiple and multi-level factors that interact in complex ways. These
factors include the individual material circumstances in which people live their lives as well
as social cohesion and psychosocial, behavioral, and biological factors, and the functioning
of the health care system. The way people interact with or experience these factors is
determined by their position in the social hierarchy along dimensions of wealth and income,
occupation, education, gender, race or ethnicity, and geographical location of residence. All
these causal factors are in turn affected by a political, economic, social, and cultural context
that determines the unequal distribution of power, prestige, and resources. Figure 1 is a
diagram of the Commission’s conceptual framework.
The Commission’s analysis reflected the intellectual and disciplinary traditions of social
epidemiology and social medicine. Social epidemiology begins with observations and
measurements of the distribution of health across social groups differentiated by factors such
as occupation, income, education, gender, ethnicity/race, age, and geographical area. This
then allows for the identification of the supra-individual determinants of health and their
distribution, and for an understanding of the causal chain from social, economic, and
political drivers to differential health outcomes in individuals and social groups. The
Commission’s recommendations for action to improve individual health and the distribution
of health are grounded in identifying the causal chain, based on empirical evidence. At the
core of the Commission’s view is the understanding that individual health — and the
distribution of health achievements across groups — is significantly influenced by
determinants outside the health care system as well as by the functioning of the system
itself. As a result, the Commission identified universal primary health care as one important
area for social action, but it is just one of the Commission’s twelve recommended areas for
action to improve health and health equity.
Social medicine begins from the recognition of the impact of social and economic conditions
on access to, and experience of, medical care as well as their direct impact on health
achievements. Therefore, social epidemiology and social medicine share the recognition of
the social determinants or social bases of health and health inequalities. Indeed, the only
thing that could be said to distinguish social epidemiology and social medicine is the extent
to which medical care is given importance in the analysis of the social causation and
distribution of health and longevity. Put in another way, social epidemiologists are
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spractitioners or supporters of social medicine, and practitioners of social medicine are social
epidemiologists, but the scope of social epidemiology is broader than medical care. The
broader the scope of social medicine’s analysis of the social conditions affecting health and
its distribution, the less social medicine can be distinguished from social epidemiology.
Given this understanding of the relationship between social medicine and social
epidemiology, it should be clear that the tradition of social medicine greatly informed the
work of the Commission, not least by many of the individuals involved who consider
themselves to be practitioners of social medicine.
The gap, the gradient, and social justice
The starting position of the Commission was that there is no inherent biological or “natural”
explanation for the gross inequalities in health achievements we see between countries and
within countries. There is no inherent biological reason why life expectancy for a girl born
in Japan is 86 years, while for a girl born in Sierra Leone it is 43 years. Nor is there a
biological explanation for why the maternal mortality ratio in Sierra Leone is 2,100 deaths
per 100,000 live births while in Ireland the ratio is 1 maternal death per 100,000 live births.5
In the case of Malawi, Paul Farmer identifies the lack of sutures, sterile drapes, and
anesthesia among the many reasons for the unacceptably high maternal mortality ratio.6 The
Commission concerns itself with such lack of necessary medical supplies — as part of the
conditions of daily living — and with the upstream causes of such conditions of daily living.
Like Farmer, the Commission asks: how can these conditions be improved through social
action?
In its Final Report, the Commission presented evidence that the systematic differences in
health achievements between countries and within countries across groups stratified by
education, income, occupation, gender, ethnicity, race, and geographical area of residence
are determined by social, political, and economic policies and practices. This evidence
militates against analyses that focus narrowly on biological processes at the individual level
in a contextual vacuum. One piece of compelling evidence can be found, for example, by
examining under-five mortality against household wealth in developing countries (Figure 2).
The difference in mortality levels within each country illustrates one detail of the scale of
inequality in this indicator, with a substantial gap between the best and the worst off and,
importantly, a step-wise gradient across the whole society.
The Commission argues that systematic differences in health achievements that are
avoidable or preventable by reasonable means are unfair; they are health “inequities.” To
return to Paul Farmer’s example, reducing maternal mortality through the provision of
sutures certainly falls into the category of reasonable means in that it is both practically
possible to provide sutures and providing sutures is neither morally offensive nor
unreasonable. The same is true of many interventions that would make significant
improvements in the conditions of daily living (the circumstances in which people are born,
grow, live, work, and age). Indeed, a major source of the frustration driving the
Commission’s work to collect evidence was the recognition of how much health and health
equity could be improved through reasonable means in contrast to the poor reasoning and
complacency of many societies and international institutions.
Based on collected evidence and its analysis of the causation and distribution of ill health,
the Commission adopted the view that taking action to reduce health inequities is a matter of
social justice. The Commission states, “Achieving health equity within a generation is
achievable, it is the right thing to do, and now is the right time to do it.”7 This is not meant
to be hollow rhetoric. Any meaningful understanding and commitment to the idea of social
justice entails addressing manifest injustices, and such manifest injustices exist where
reasonable means could be deployed to alleviate disproportionate ill health or prevent
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smortality. This social justice imperative applies to improving the health of those who suffer
most egregiously as well as improving the health of those represented by the gradient, the
remaining majority of the population. In light of the unprecedented intellectual and material
resources that exist in the world today, the goal of social action, in principle, should be to
flatten the social gradient in health by leveling up health outcomes across the social
spectrum so that all are capable of achieving the health of the healthiest. This is what is
meant by “closing the gap in a generation.”
Is closing the gap in a generation feasible?
Numerous epidemiological studies have shown that gaps and gradients in health can vary
significantly between countries and within countries over time, and there have been natural
experiments that also provide valuable information. We know, therefore, that average
measures of population health and the distribution of health are susceptible to social and
political action. For example, with the deep political, social, and economic changes that
followed the dissolution of the former USSR, average population health measures worsened,
and the gradient in adult mortality by education steepened in Russia since the 1980s.8 In
New Zealand, “indigenous inequalities,” that is, measurable health inequalities between
mortality rates of the indigenous and non-indigenous populations, widened between the
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s following a period when structural adjustment policies were
introduced and social and income inequalities increased. These inequalities then narrowed
following the introduction of pro-equity policies and health reforms in the late 1990s.9
Prevalence of certain chronic diseases is lower among low-income residents in the Canadian
province of Quebec, which instigated an anti-poverty strategy in 2002, than in equivalent
populations in other Canadian provinces that did not have such a policy.10 Studies
comparing Nordic countries with other developed countries associate generous and universal
social welfare policies with lower levels of poverty and better outcomes for disadvantaged
people.11 While these findings do not demonstrate direct causality, there is a plausible
causal chain linking political decisions and social action to changes in the health of entire
populations and lower socioeconomic groups. We have evidence that the absolute levels and
social gradient of health achievements can rapidly worsen within a single generation.12 The
Commission asserts that health and health equity could also improve dramatically in a single
generation if and when appropriate social action is taken within and across countries.
THE COMMISSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
From the start, the Commission based its work on an awareness of human rights and the
relationship between human rights and health. It also built on opportunities to discuss with
human rights experts — including Paul Hunt, the former United Nations Rapporteur on the
Right to Health — the possible role of international human rights law in the Commission’s
analysis and Final Report. While it was clear that human rights law would be an important
part of implementing the Commission’s recommendations, members of the Commission
were not convinced that explicit consideration of the legal human right to health changed
their final causal analysis. That is, to what extent can the violation of human rights — as
defined by international statutes — explain the (social) causation and distribution of ill
health and mortality? On the one hand, all the social determinants identified thus far in the
causal chain of ill health and mortality could conceivably be recast as violations of human
rights. Such recasting without providing the underlying epidemiological information and
analysis would not in and of itself supply convincing evidence of causation. Further,
providing epidemiological evidence with accompanying human rights legal analysis does
not provide additional explanatory value. After epidemiological analysis, however, human
rights law has immense value in guiding how societies must act in order to protect, promote,
and fulfill the rights implicated in the social epidemiological analysis. The Commission said
as much in the Final Report by stating that the right to health as set out by Paul Hunt’s report
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spresents a compelling case for action on the social determinants of health. On the other
hand, it is not immediately clear how a human rights analysis of health can capture some of
the central findings in social epidemiology, namely, the observations about the health of
social groups and the broad social gradient in health within and across countries.
When evaluating the role of human rights in the Commission’s analysis and
recommendations, one also must bear in mind that the Commission was very aware that
within the WHO and in the global health policy arena, the two dominant approaches to
analyzing poor health and health inequalities focus on medical interventions/health systems
or economic policy. The focus on disease prevalence and medical care/health systems aims
to address ill health through the provision of medical interventions such as vertical programs
or better functioning of health systems broadly conceived. And the perspective of
economics, exemplified by the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, focuses
on improving the cost-effectiveness of health systems in order to improve economic growth
while also being mindful of the health needs of the “ultra” income-poor. The Commission
championed an alternative framework of analysis that presented evidence of the full breadth
of social determinants of health beyond that generally considered within the realm of
medical interventions/health systems. The Commission also argued that all avoidable ill
health and health inequalities must be addressed as a matter of social justice, not just those
factors instrumental to economic growth.
Furthermore, the Commissioners were well aware that the social distribution of ill health
and health achievements is a secondary concern in both the focus on controlling diseases
and mortality through medical interventions and in investing in health for economic growth.
It is quite conceivable that average indicators of health or economic growth targets could be
reached through focusing on improving the health achievements of the more advantaged in
societies. This is why equity and social justice are concerns that run throughout the
Commission’s analysis. Finally, but not least important, the Commission wanted to show
that the health of individuals in both rich and poor countries could be evaluated within one
framework of analysis, that the preventable deaths and suffering of the disadvantaged and
the social gradient as it affects health in both rich and poor countries are the result of the
way in which we organize our societies through economic, social, and political policies and
practices.13 For these reasons and more, the Commission drew largely on the methods of
social and natural sciences research in order to analyze the causes and distribution of ill
health and mortality within and across countries.
Nevertheless, the idea of human rights and entitlements came to the fore throughout the
Commission’s discussions. Dr. Ricardo Lagos, former President of Chile and a member of
the Commission, pointed out that Chile has introduced a system of social guarantees, or
entitlements to health care, for a number of health conditions as rights of citizenship. Mirai
Chatterjee, a Commission member from India, described how the Self Employed Women’s
Association campaigned and won legal rights for poor women in Ahmedabad to work as
street market traders.14 So the ideas of human rights as well as rights and entitlements were
present throughout the functioning of the Commission and appear in the Final Report. At the
same time, the Commissioners and others would assert that human rights do not encompass
the entirety of the idea of social justice. Advancing health and health equity as a matter of
social justice will entail promoting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights, including the
right to health, as well as taking additional social action. Moreover, in thinking about health
and social justice, the Commission recognized an affinity between Amartya Sen’s ethical
arguments for seeing social justice as the expansion of freedoms and social epidemiological
research on the effects on health of having control, autonomy, and ability to participate in
social relationships.15 Indeed, Sen’s thinking was influential in setting up the Commission
and he served as one of the Commissioners. Expanding on Sen’s line of reasoning, the
Venkatapuram et al. Page 6
Health Hum Rights. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 June 27.
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
P
M
C
 
F
u
n
d
e
r
s
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
t
s
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
P
M
C
 
F
u
n
d
e
r
s
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
t
sCommission positioned the concept of empowerment for individuals, communities, and
nations across three dimensions — material needs, psychosocial factors (having control over
one’s life), and political voice and participation in decision-making processes — as
fundamental to making progress toward health equity.
In responding to the Commission’s Final Report, some human rights advocates such as Paul
Hunt and Mary Robinson have remarked that it should have granted a larger and far more
central role to human rights.16 Received in the positive and constructive manner that Hunt
and Robinson intended, these comments have been understood to mean that there is much
more unexplored potential in bringing together human rights analysis and social
epidemiology/social medicine. For example, the role of legal institutions, particularly those
institutions that protect constitutional and international human rights, may have distinct
contributions to make in addressing certain social determinants of health or for establishing
social norms. Indeed, no modern approach to health and human rights would exist without
the legal institutions that have established human rights law. Although the Commission has
formally concluded its activities, as part of the follow-on activities, there have been efforts
to think more concertedly on integrating social epidemiology/social medicine and human
rights. In the next section, we present some of the initial analysis of the convergences and
contrasts between social epidemiology/social medicine approaches and human rights-based
approaches. While we identify a divergence at the point of causal analysis of health, we
argue these approaches are not only convergent — in the sense that they both have common
concern and push toward the same goal of greater health equity — but that they are also
interdependent and must work together in order to advance health and health equity within
and across countries. As concrete illustration of our reasoning about how social
epidemiology/social medicine and human rights approaches can and should be integrated
and jointly deployed to advance health and health equity, we have taken the liberty of
focusing on Paul Farmer’s rhetorical question in an earlier issue of this journal, “Should
there be a right to sutures?”17
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
In describing a visit to Malawi, Farmer reported the maternal mortality ratio in Malawi as
being a shocking 1,800 per 100,000 live births. He described how the two obstetricians in a
maternity hospital faced severe shortcomings in supplies, facilities, and personnel compared
with the Harvard teaching hospitals where Farmer works part of the year. However, as a
result of the efforts of the two Malawian obstetricians, the maternal mortality ratio within
the hospital was reported to be 300 per 100,000 at the time of his visit. Given that this
within-hospital maternal mortality ratio is still deplorably high, the fact that it could be seen
as a consolation that it was one-sixth of the national ratio left Farmer speechless. Tarek
Meguid, one of the obstetricians who showed Farmer around the hospital, described the lack
of material resources — of supplies, facilities, and personnel — in terms of human rights
abuses. Farmer, in turn, asked readers “Should there be a right to sutures? To sterile drapes?
To anesthesia?”18
Most readers would likely answer with a resounding “Yes, of course!” And yet, Farmer’s
questions raise one of the central conceptual problems in the health and human rights
paradigm: how to frame a right to something that is not explicitly identified in human rights
law? How to reconcile an understanding of the often dire health situation “on the ground”
with the formal texts of human rights law is a dilemma for which even those deeply
committed to the ideals of human rights often pursue remarkably different paths in order to
advance global health and health equity. Even among human rights advocates, (putting aside
the views of the skeptics and critics of human rights), if a particular right to something does
not appear in the legal documents, then such a human right does not exist. But what if one
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sbelieves, for example, that the provision of sutures is not only a reasonable and feasible
means to prevent deaths but that it should be seen as a human right? In the following
discussion, we frame this issue as one that may be addressed by pursuing three possible
paths. Each path is a potential answer when faced with this not-so-uncommon situation,
where the identification of the causal pathways to ill health and mortality on the ground is
sought to be integrated with the idea and law of human rights.
Path 1 would offer the choice to continue to engage with international human rights law and
with attempts to interpret the existing law via documentation, reporting, and various avenues
of enforcement with the goal of addressing the missing cause or treatment, such as in the
example of the provision of sutures. Path 2, rather than seeking formal engagement with
human rights law, would seek to derive principles and values from human rights law and
infuse them into health programs and interactions between individuals on the ground.
Finally, Path 3 would in fact back away from the arena of human rights law and would
instead attempt to bridge the analysis of the causes and distribution of ill health and
mortality on the ground with ethical reasoning about social justice. Out of such ethical
reasoning — informed by evidence of the causes, inequalities, and consequences of ill health
— could arise arguments for advancing rights and other types of social action. The three
paths are not mutually exclusive; all three could be effective to various degrees and could
function in different arenas and at different institutional levels — international, national,
community, and family.
The Commission followed the third path for some of the reasons outlined above.
Nevertheless, because it appears that human rights are given a diminished role in Path 3 in
comparison to the first two paths, it seems worthwhile to examine the intellectual and
strategic motivations for pursuing each of the different ways of engaging with human rights
to advance health and health equity.
On seeing the lack of medical supplies in Malawi as part of the causal chain of maternal
mortality among poor women, Farmer was motivated to ask the questions in terms of
“should there be a right?” because there are in fact, no enunciated human rights to sutures, to
sterile drapes, or anesthesia. If there were indeed such human rights to sutures and other
relevant medical supplies and services stated in the law, the concern would, understandably,
be about enforcement and implementation of the legal rights. Indeed, a significant part — if
not most — of the health and human rights scholarship over the past decade has concerned
interpreting, implementing, or enforcing the right to health and other human rights related to
health already existing in international law. But there is no such explicitly articulated legal
right to sutures. Nevertheless, Farmer continues to press this example in terms of human
rights law, calling attention to a broader definition of human rights that encompasses
economic and social rights. Although no explicit human right to sutures is stated in either
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, or in Right to Health General Comment No. 14, the existing language and rights in
these legal human rights documents can be interpreted to provide individuals with a right to
such essential health care supplies as sutures, sterile drapes, and anesthesia. Should
effectively realizing this interpretation prove difficult, then it may still be possible to
interpret rights to these supplies in the more recent conventions and declarations. For those
who are disturbed about the unjustifiable lack of life-saving materials — that is, of medical
neglect — such a search to make use of human rights law is motivated by both the fact that
economic and social rights are intended to guarantee the material needs of human beings,
and because human rights law is law; it has potential power — legal, political, and moral —
to make governments and, increasingly, other actors, behave in particular ways to provide
material goods and social conditions.
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sFarmer presents an additional line of reasoning for increased enforcement of economic and
social rights (that is, pursuing Path 1), aside from the fact that they imply rights to various
health care goods and services. He argues that more vigorous enforcement of economic and
social rights would improve living conditions, leading to better health outcomes. To carry
this point further, such improved health achievements would, in turn, also create more active
citizens and democratic institutions. At the risk of being too simplistic, the reasoning for
pursuing Path 1 would be to argue that where the causes of preventable morbidity and
mortality are due to medical neglect and material privation, the enforcement of economic
and social rights will provide health care, create conditions for better health and longevity,
and create stronger social and political institutions. Farmer and many other individuals
following this line of reasoning exhort practitioners of health and human rights and public
health communities (and anyone else with the power to effect change) to fight against the
entrenched orthodoxies in so many arenas, and to champion the enforcement and realization
of economic and social rights. From this perspective, it is understandable, then, why human
rights advocates express disappointment when analysis of health issues, especially on a
global scale, is not explicitly framed in terms of existing human rights law, particularly an
overarching right to health. It appears to be a wasted opportunity, one that fails both to
recognize and make use of the entitlements identified in human rights law at the same time it
fails to help support the efforts for greater enforcement and implementation of human rights
law, particularly economic and social rights.
It is on this point — the recognition of the effects of economic and social conditions on the
health of individuals and populations — that social medicine and human rights perspectives
converge. The practice of social medicine has a long history and its practitioners have been
centrally focused on the social conditions affecting the health of the worst off in societies.
There has always been an overlap between those who are socially excluded from economic,
political, and other resources and those who bear the highest burden of poor health. The
causal relationship between poor health and social, economic, and political deprivations
would understandably lead any medical professional working with the socially excluded to
draw on concepts of protections and entitlements such as those enshrined in international
human rights. Where it is clearly visible that the social structure — the social, economic,
and political conditions and underlying ideologies — is allowing or, indeed, directly causing
avoidable disease and deaths on a large scale, the idea and law of human rights appears to be
the only available mechanism to fight back; one might envision human rights in such a
setting acting as a safety net that empowers those who suffer most egregiously to claw back
up the great chasm of inequality and deprivation. Moreover, in the present era of increasing
globalization, international human rights law may be the best available instrument to address
the ill health caused by transnational actors who are, in many cases, more powerful than
some governments.
Before presenting points seen as critical of such rights-based approaches to health issues —
especially as these paths reflect the perspectives of individuals whom we greatly admire —
it seems appropriate and necessary to recall the words of Onora O’Neill, a notable
philosopher who has written extensively on human rights. When asked by one of the authors
of this article why she seems to be so critical of some arguments for human rights while also
being so emphatically concerned with acute deprivations in the world, she replied that it is
because we care so much about the idea of human rights that we must ensure that arguments
to support them are unimpeachable.19 So, it is our hope that our evaluation of the first two
approaches — increased enforcement of economic and social rights (Path 1) and infusing
principles of human rights legislation into health programs and interactions between
individuals on the ground (Path 2) — should not be misunderstood as being critical of the
idea of human rights in our effort to share our reasoning for choosing the third path, which
appears to diminish the role of human rights in comparison to the first two. It is indeed
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sbecause we care about the idea of human rights greatly that we are publicly presenting our
reasoning. Sofia Gruskin, Editor of this journal for over a decade, expressed a similar
concern when she wrote that “[g]reater clarity about the central paradigms of health and
human rights is essential to make our work more effective, as well as to enable us to make
counter-arguments that will be persuasive not only to the skeptics but to the public health
community at large.”20
This idea that international human rights law taken as a whole offers both rights to health
care and rights to the social and material conditions for good health was argued by Jonathan
Mann and colleagues in the very first issue of this journal in 1994.21 Central to their “health
and human rights framework” hypothesis was the notion that “the promotion and protection
of human rights and promotion and protection of health are fundamentally linked.”22 It was
evidently clear in the early 1990s, in light of the way HIV/AIDS was being dealt with in
most countries, that public health programs can negatively affect human rights and that
human rights violations can have negative health effects. Mann and colleagues transformed
the conflict between a public health policy perspective and a human rights perspective into a
hypothesis that a society that realizes the full breadth of human rights would produce
healthier individuals and populations. Health programs, they argued, whether public health
or clinical, that were in line with human rights would lead to better health outcomes, and the
respect for all human rights would create conditions for individuals to be healthier. In fact it
should be noted that the Commission has expressed a similar view in the Final Report that
correctly designing the social processes in society to meet the needs or expand freedoms of
its members will improve health and health equity. The Commission was able, rather than
presenting it as a hypothesis, to make this argument as a conclusion drawn from empirical
research.
One remarkable aspect of Mann’s 1994 hypothesis is that it leads to conceptualizing human
rights law as one component of a model of causation and distribution of health. This is
illustrated in the discussion about possible ways to test the hypothesis, where Mann and his
colleagues wrote, “For example, health professionals could consider using the International
Bill of Human Rights as a coherent guide for assessing health status of individuals or
populations; the extent to which human rights are realized may represent a better and more
comprehensive index of well-being than traditional health status indicators.”23 While it was
a groundbreaking contribution to overlay human rights law onto an analysis of the causes,
distribution, and social responses to health issues, the consequent substitution of human
rights law for the actual causes of ill health in a model of causation and distribution of health
is problematic. As evident in our sutures example, for instance, the distinction between the
lack of sutures and the lack of the right to sutures in explaining maternal mortality is
profound in many respects and should not be minimized.
The observation that the lack of sutures plays a role in the causes of maternal mortality
necessarily precedes reasoning that there should be a right to sutures. This epistemological
priority or precedence of recognizing the causal role of the lack of sutures to the assertion
that there should be a right to sutures is the source of consequent divergence between a
social epidemiology/social medicine and a human rights approach to advancing health and
health equity. Some human rights advocates would likely want to assert that it is the
violation of the right to sutures that causes maternal mortality. When it is asserted that the
lack of a right to something is the cause of ill health and mortality, the distinction between
the causal role and importance of that something and the right to that something collapses.
Moreover, the collapsing of the two ideas creates confusion as to what is a human right.
Human rights are not natural facts or objects, but ethical assertions about claims, privileges,
liberties, immunities, and powers in relation to various human capabilities, including those
capabilities expressed indirectly via material things.24 Unnecessary and avoidable
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smisunderstandings result from attempting to emphasize the importance of human rights by
casting them as direct causal components of a model of causation and distribution of ill
health and mortality. Moreover, such attempts undermine the important scientific analysis of
causal pathways and distribution of ill health and open the analysis to the risk of being
dismissed as conceptually incoherent. Last, such an analysis potentially alienates social and
natural science researchers who can be valuable allies in the effort to advance health equity.
The health and human rights framework can be very powerful indeed, if it supplements
rather than attempts to substitute the analysis of the natural and social causes, distribution,
and consequences of ill health and mortality. We suggest further below one possible way
that epidemiology and human rights might be integrated.
But what about the case in which someone is advocating a right to sutures after recognizing
the lack of sutures as a direct cause of maternal mortality? For the practitioner of social
medicine, the primary aim is not to enforce economic and social rights, or any other rights,
for their own sake. Rather, the preeminent goal is to address avoidable ill health and
mortality, the curtailment of well-being. Therefore, enforcement of economic and social
rights is instrumental in order to address the needs for health care and other social conditions
and material goods. The problem arises when the law is silent about some pressing concern,
or when the law is insufficient, or, indeed, incoherent. Aside from being entangled in legal
rubric, stretching the law to cover the causes, cures, and other necessary social interventions
for some particular health deprivation may begin to look like “the tail is wagging the dog.”
When there is no right to sutures, and yet the lack of sutures leads to the deaths of hundreds
of thousands of women each year, it is understandable to seek a right to sutures somewhere
in the law. Yet neither the existing economic and social rights nor any language in the
current human rights corpus may be capable of doing all the work we want them to do. At
the same time, it would be unacceptable to conclude that the causes that are killing people
are not human rights concerns simply because they are not explicitly identified in the
existing law, and also unacceptable to opportunistically stretch the meaning of rights so
much that the term “human rights” risks becoming an empty concept. Indeed, it is very
helpful if some human rights exist in the law that have direct bearing on a health issue at
hand, but human rights law should be recognized as being only one of many instruments of
advancing health and health equity.
The second problem with following Path 1 — increased enforcement of economic and social
rights — is one of insufficient motivating capacity. The large number of human rights
advocacy organizations in the world testifies to the fact that the mere existence of human
rights law does not mean that human rights are universally or even locally realized. Even at
the domestic level, laws identifying certain rights do not mean that individuals, especially
those that are socially marginalized, have their rights respected or fulfilled. To exhort that
the full spectrum of legal rights must be respected because it says so in the law requires a
respect for law, the means to enforce it, and mechanisms to hold individuals or institutions
accountable for violations. While motivating respect for rights is difficult and requires
constant vigilance and resources, it is nearly impossible to enforce a right to something that
may not clearly exist in the law, especially in places where there is no respect for the law or
a lack of institutions to enforce rights. It should not go unnoticed, however, that individuals
and communities throughout the world recognize and respect various rights even when such
rights are not specifically stated in the law. And if they are in the law, respecting such rights
may not be primarily motivated by the fact they are enshrined in the law. Before the
relatively recent establishment of international human rights law, advocates for the respect
of human rights and for social change drew on arguments for why such things are good and
“the right thing to do.” Public statements to provide such reasoning were often accompanied
by large-scale social mobilization; indeed, this ethico-moral approach was often much more
comprehensive than the method currently employed by rights activists, of pointing to what is
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sexplicitly stated in the law and playing language games. Realizing rights, whether economic
and social or civil and political, by means of assertions that they must be respected simply
because it says so in international law, is neither necessary nor sufficient for advancing
health and health equity — unless and until international law has the power to command full
adherence and there are institutional capacities and resources in all countries to
(progressively) realize all human rights.
In an attempt partially to overcome many of the structural and conceptual problems in
engaging with human rights law, Lynn Freedman has proposed an alternative approach to
expand the reach and relevance of human rights “on the ground.”25 Her strategy is
innovative in that it seeks to supplement the dominant approach to human rights work that
takes place within international institutions as academic and legal discussions, and instead
focuses on holding governments accountable for upholding human rights. We suggest
Freedman’s approach as our Path 2. Freedman advocates a strategy that extracts various
values and principles from existing human rights law and applies them to local contexts —
the on-the-ground analysis of the causal chain of ill health and mortality. While Freedman
focuses on addressing maternal mortality, and her approach fits nicely with our example of
the right to sutures, this strategy could be applied to addressing any health issue.
Motivated by the understanding that human dignity is the core value of human rights law
and is meant to inspire profound and fundamental change in everyday interactions,
Freedman proposes communities identify a set of values and principles in human rights law
and then articulate how they can help guide community-level programs to address maternal
mortality. Using the case of the right to sutures, following Freedman’s path would mean that
we do not look for a right to sutures in the law but that the values and principles of human
rights law can help communities identify, analyze, and address maternal mortality. In fact,
Freedman interprets the legal discourse on the human right to health as encompassing the
right not to die an avoidable death in pregnancy and childbirth. This right then translates into
a societal obligation to provide emergency obstetric care, which would entail the provision
of sutures when needed. But even when dealing with nongovernmental actors and a concern
not just about sutures but maternal mortality more broadly, Freedman argues that the two
values of human dignity and non-discrimination (among others), which are central to human
rights law, can and should guide the manner in which emergency obstetric care is provided
to patients and families as well as how it impacts hospital staff. This strategy may be seen as
expanding human rights work, perhaps even liberating human rights from the existing legal
language and mechanisms of international law. Importantly, rather than making rights into
causal components of health and well-being, Freedman suggests that human rights values
and principles, when combined with other health-related disciplines such as epidemiology,
medicine, and operations research, can provide a plan of action for communities and states
— in other words, human rights discourse can become a community health planning tool.
Although it is an important and worthwhile strategy to apply human rights law to the reality
of how individuals are living their daily lives, this path also suffers from insufficient power
as a tool for motivation. It is unclear as to why the values and principles that Freedman uses
to guide maternal mortality programs should be convincing to others simply on the basis of
their presence in human rights legislation. Indeed, is it not ethical reasoning that first
produced the values that then became enshrined as various rights in human rights law? That
is, why would individuals and communities change their views and behaviors from the
status quo to be in line with these values because these values are derived from human rights
law? Granted, there is an international consensus embodied in such laws, but how
convincing is it that individuals need to work and interact or programs are designed and
operated in accordance with certain values and principles because they were derived from
human rights law? Perhaps more persuasive would be an ethical or moral argument. Why
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snot present these values and principles as being important in the analysis of health issues and
require allegiance because it is the right thing to do, or is what is demanded by social
justice? Dignity, non-discrimination, equality, and participation are all values than can be
highlighted within the ethical reasoning concerning what to do about maternal mortality in
communities throughout the world. Synthesizing scientific and empirical insights from fields
such as epidemiology, medicine, operations research, and public health with ethical
reasoning about social justice by communities should be just as motivating — if not more so
— for taking action than arguing that certain value-motivated actions are required simply
because the values can be found in human rights law.
Path 2, as argued by Freedman, is indeed the middle ground between Path 1 and Path 3 (the
path taken by the Commission). The first path, in its best form, seeks to link the causal and
distributional analysis of health issues with international human rights law. The second path
seeks to craft and guide a social response by integrating various values with necessary and
helpful insights from different fields while remaining grounded in human rights law. The
third path can be seen as being a step farther away from either of the first two, as it seeks to
derive values from ethical reasoning that takes place at community-level, national, regional,
and global spheres. The initial conclusion of that ethical reasoning, which took place within
the Commission and is now ongoing and open to all, was to classify ill health and health
inequalities that are avoidable through reasonable means as inequities. Furthermore, the
Commission determined that such manifest inequities must be addressed as a matter of
social justice. In addition to this ethical argument — that if one can reasonably prevent ill
health and death, one should do so — is the argument that one must act to address social
determinants of ill health and health inequalities on the basis of the duties to protect,
promote, and fulfill relevant human rights.
There is broad convergence between research and action on rights-based approaches and
social determinants of health when existing international agreements about human rights
encompass actions to address the relevant social determinants. Indeed, perhaps it can be
argued that enunciated rights and values implicit in human rights law cover the entire gamut
of the social determinants of ill health and mortality. However, social epidemiology has
more explanatory potential than human rights approaches because the objects of research are
not themselves ethical assertions, nor is the scope of social epidemiology limited by what is
written in the law. Yet human rights law has the power to bridge social epidemiology with
social action. The power of human rights lies in its prescriptive power to guide prospective
social action through identifying legal obligations as well as underlying moral obligations of
societies to act in particular ways. However, local and global discussions that link social
epidemiological analysis with ethical reasoning about social justice would involve more
actors and allow for a broader scope of social action, more expansive rights and
responsibilities, and easier social acceptance. It is necessary to find a way to integrate these
two approaches.
Perhaps one method that avoids the conflation of causal factors and human rights is to
incorporate rights as distal factors in the chain of causation. A social environment that does
not protect, promote, or fulfill the rights to food, clothing, shelter, or civil and political
liberties can be understood to have a role in the chain of causation and distribution of ill
health without being a direct causal factor. It would also make understandable the assertion
that if individuals have a right to health, then they should also have a right to the
determinants of health. In this way, integrating epidemiology and human rights — or
constitutional rights for that matter — would illuminate the role of the lack of rights in the
causal chain of ill health and mortality, while also avoiding having to show that every
violation of a human right is bad for health. Such an integrated framework could move
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sforward the agenda to improve health and health equity by harnessing the power of both
human rights and epidemiology.
JOINT PROJECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Given that social epidemiology, social medicine, and human rights-based approaches are all
important and productive methodologies to advance health and health equity, it behooves all
involved to attempt to build greater inter-theoretic coherence and collaboration. There is
undoubtedly much to be gained intellectually and practically from interdisciplinary efforts.
We suggest four possible areas for action with an open invitation for further proposals.
First, there is the obvious need to undertake a more thorough mapping of the Commission’s
existing analysis using human rights law. This is not to explain ill health and inequalities in
terms of human rights violations, but rather to identify what is required in the form of social
action as a matter of law. It may also be worthwhile to investigate how to motivate social
action at the community level to address the social determinants of ill health and health
inequalities through enriching local deliberations with human rights principles. Second,
much could be gained from bringing together social epidemiology and human rights
analyses to develop policy indicators for the implementation of the Commission’s
recommendations as well as progressive realization of the right to health. Third, the
Commission has (hopefully) achieved one of its main goals, to bring equity to the center of
discussions on health. Human rights advocates could help considerably by providing support
in the form of human rights-based arguments for addressing social gradients in health. Last,
not least important, a rights-based approach to health causes, distribution, and consequences
must be created, one that is informed by, and builds inter-theoretic coherence with, social
epidemiology as well as other relevant fields, not least of which are public health,
economics, and operations research.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the editors and reviewers for their valuable assistance. Research for the article was
made supported by the Joint ESRC–DFID Scheme for research on international poverty reduction (RES–167–25–
0369) and the Department of Health in England.
Biography
Michael Marmot served as Chairman of the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of
Health and the Strategic Review of Health Inequalities in England Post 2010. He is currently
Chair of the European Review on the social determinants of health and the health divide.
REFERENCES
1. Information about the Commission is available at http://www.who.int/social_determinants/the-
commission/en/index.html. For the complete final report, see Commission on Social Determinants
of Health. Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through action on the social determinants
of health. Final Report of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health. 2008World Health
OrganizationGenevaAvailable at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/
2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf
2. Ibid.
3. The three principles of action are listed in Commission on Social Determinants of Health. :2.(see
note 1)
4. World Health Organization. WHA 62.14: Reducing health inequities through action on the social
determinants of health. In: World Health Organization. , editor. Sixty-second World Health
Assembly, Geneva, 18–22 May 2008, resolutions and decisions, annexes; Geneva: World Health
Venkatapuram et al. Page 14
Health Hum Rights. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 June 27.
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
P
M
C
 
F
u
n
d
e
r
s
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
t
s
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
P
M
C
 
F
u
n
d
e
r
s
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
t
sOrganization; 2009. p. 21-24.Available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA62-REC1/
WHA62_REC1-en.pdf
5. World Health Organization. World Health Statistics 2009. World Health Organization; Geneva:
2009.
6. Farmer P. Challenging orthodoxies: The road ahead for health and human rights. Health and Human
Rights: An International Journal. 2008; 10(1):5–19. the discussion on sutures, sterile drapes, and
anesthesia is at p. 9. Available at http://www.hhrjournal.org/index.php/hhr/article/view/33/102.
7. Commission on Social Determinants of Health. p. 3(see note 1)
8. Murphy M, Bobak M, Nicholson A, et al. The widening gap in mortality by educational level in the
Russian Federation, 1980–2001. American Journal of Public Health. 2006; 96(7):1293–1299.
[PubMed: 16735629]
9. Tobias M, Blakely T, Matheson D, et al. Changing trends in indigenous inequalities in mortality:
Lessons from New Zealand. International Journal of Epidemiology. 2009; 38(6):1711–1722.
[PubMed: 19332501]
10. Fang R, Kmetic A, Millar J, Drasic L. Disparities in chronic disease among Canada’s low-income
populations. Preventing Chronic Disease. 2009; 6(4):1–9. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/
issues/2009/oct/08_0254.htm.
11. Lundberg, O.; Yngwe, MÅ.; Stjärne, MK., et al. The Nordic experience: Welfare states and public
health (NEWS). Centre for Health Equity Studies [CHESS]; University/Karolinska Institutet;
Stockholm: 2008. Health Equity Studies 12StockholmAvailable at http://www.chess.su.se/content/
1/c6/02/90/15/NEWS_Rapport_080819.pdf
12. On this point, see discussion in Commission on Social Determinants of Health. :32–33.(see note 1)
13. Marmot M. Health in an unequal world. Lancet. 2006; 368(9552):2081–2094. [PubMed:
17161730]
14. Commission on Social Determinants of Health. p. 63(see note 1)
15. Sen, A. Development as freedom. Knopf; New York: 1999. Marmot, M. Status syndrome: How
your social standing directly affects your health and life expectancy. Bloomsbury; London: 2004.
16. Hunt P. Missed opportunities: Human rights and the Commission on Social Determinants of
Health. Global Health Promotion. 2009; 1757-9759(Supp 1):36–41. doi:
10.1177/1757975909103747. Available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/students/right-to-
health-ghac/missed-opportunities.pdf. [PubMed: 19477829]
17. Farmer. p. 9(see note 6)
18. Ibid.
19. Personal communication.
20. Gruskin S. Rights-based approaches to health: Something for everyone. Health and Human Rights:
An International Journal. 2006; 9(2):6. [Editorial]. Available at http://www.hhrjournal.org/
archives-pdf/4065399.pdf.bannered.pdf.
21. Mann J, Goskin L, Gruskin S, et al. Health and human rights. Health and Human Rights: An
International Journal. 1994; 1(1):6–23. Available at http://www.hhrjournal.org/archives-pdf/
4065260.pdf.bannered.pdf.
22. Ibid. p. 21
23. Ibid.
24. Sen, A. The idea of justice. Allen Lane; London: 2009. Thomson, JJ. The realm of rights. Harvard
University Press; Cambridge, MA: 1990.
25. Freedman LP. Using human rights in maternal mortality programs: From analysis to strategy.
International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics. 2001; 75:51–60. [PubMed: 11597619]
Venkatapuram et al. Page 15
Health Hum Rights. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 June 27.
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
P
M
C
 
F
u
n
d
e
r
s
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
t
s
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
P
M
C
 
F
u
n
d
e
r
s
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
 
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
i
p
t
sFigure 1.
Commission on Social Determinants of Health conceptual framework
Source: Commission on Social Determinants of Health, Closing the gap in a generation:
Health equity through action on the social determinants of health. Final Report of the
Commission on Social Determinants of Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2008),
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Amended from O. Solar and A. Irwin, “A conceptual framework for action on the social
determinants of health,” in Discussion paper for the Commission on Social Determinants of
Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2007). Available at http://www.who.int/
social_determinants/resources/csdh_framework_action_05_07.pdf. Reprinted with
permission.
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sFigure 2.
Under-5 mortality rate per 1000 live births by level of household wealth.
Source: Commission on Social Determinants of Health, Closing the gap in a generation:
health equity through action on the social determinants of health. Final Report of the
Commission on Social Determinants of Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2008),
p. 30, using DHS data adapted from D. R. Gwatkin, S. Rutstein, K. Johnson, et al., Socio-
economic differences in health, nutrition, and population within developing countries: An
overview, Country Reports on HNP and Poverty (Washington: World Bank, 2007).
Reprinted with permission.
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